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Why Lasker Matters
by GM Andrew
Soltis
Reviewed by
Prof. Nagesh Havanur
Batsford, 2006
ISBN: 0713489839
320 pages, softcover
Figurine Algebraic Notation
|
A version of this review was previously published at
Kingpin.
This book has received both bouquets and brickbats
from reviewers. A major point of criticism is that it fails to answer
the question why Lasker matters. This is rather strange as in the
Introduction the author takes pains to point out the relevance of
Lasker’s play today:
-
In strategic
ideas he was ahead of his time.
-
He was
undogmatic, violating general principles whenever the situation demanded
it.
-
He assessed
positions in concrete terms with specific targets in view, rather than
abstract generalities.
-
He understood
positional sacrifices. He used tactics for positional ends.
-
He knew how and
when to aim for complications to fight back from an inferior position.
All this is fine.
But the blurb also
states that Andrew Soltis reveals for the first time the winning formula
behind Lasker’s phenomenal achievement. Not really. There is
no such instant formula to be gathered from Lasker’s games (or for that
matter, any great player’s games.) Otherwise, all of us would be
copying it to become world champions.
Similarly it is true that few of his
contemporaries understood Lasker. Dr. Tarrasch claimed that he
hypnotized his opponents. Reti thought that he deliberately made“ bad”
moves to confuse his opponent.
But Soltis seems to have overshot his bolt
in criticizing Lasker for misleading the chess world about his elusive
style:
 The one person who could unravel the mystery of Emanuel Lasker was Emanuel
Lasker. But unlike Steinitz and others of his era, who kept few
secrets, Lasker said little about his chess instincts and often seemed to
be trying to mislead his opponents. In one of his articles he had this to
say: “About my style very much has been written, comprehensible and
incomprehensible, deep and superficial, praise and criticism. And
after being silent on this question for a long time, I wish to speak about
it myself.” He then went on, in the Soviet Yearbook for 1932-35, to
say his talent lies in the sphere of combinations”(!) Considering how
rarely he combined, this must be one of his final jokes upon the chess
world. (p.7)
Is it? Soltis has missed the point of
Lasker’s self-deprecating observation. The former world champion was
modestly referring to his tactical skill. The following homage from
one of his great adversaries sheds light on both his positional judgment and
understanding of combinations:
“No other great master has been so misunderstood by the vast majority of
chess amateurs and even by many masters, as has Emanuel Lasker. It
was often said of Lasker that he had rather a dry style, that he could not
play brilliantly and that his victories were the result of his uncanny
endgame skill and of his opponent’s mistakes. That he was a great
endgame player is unquestionable; in fact he was the greatest I have ever
known. But he was also the most profound and the most imaginative
player I have ever known.
Some time after I had won the world title, my good friend Walter Penn
Shipley of Philadelphia wrote me a letter in which he said, “You and Lasker are the only players, so far as I know, who can make combinations
which don’t exist on the chessboard on the chessboard!”
When one takes into consideration that Shipley was one of the strongest
American amateurs in the United States for a great many years and that he
had known Steinitz and Pillsbury intimately, his comment tells us a great
deal about Lasker’s style. Shipley, who enjoyed friendly relations
with Lasker over a period of several decades, had been the umpire of
the first match for the world championship between Steinitz and Lasker.
Before this match, Shipley once told me, Lasker had devoted himself to a
very thorough study of the openings, particularly those variations which
were Steinitz’s favourites. This disposes of the claim frequently
made by annotators to the effect that Lasker never gave much attention to
the openings. The fact is that he had an excellent knowledge of
them, but he freely disagreed with much that passed for authoritative
doctrine.
He knew what he wanted, but his goals were not the goals of other masters.
Lasker never evaded the complications of the middlegame - a sign of his
confidence in his combinative powers and in his capacity for accurate
appraisal of any given position. These qualities were demonstrated
in the most convincing manner in his matches. Even towards the end,
during the great Nottingham Tournament, when he was sixty-eight, his quick
sight of the board was quite notable.
In this connection I am reminded of the following incident: I had
just won a very important game and was on my way back to the hotel.
During the course of the game, my opponent* built up a magnificent
position. At a certain point he saw an opportunity to win the
exchange and did so. Yet he lost the game. Some of the world’s
greatest masters, who were present, began to study the game. All of
them began their investigations from the point where my opponent had the
exchange, for they assumed that this had been the proper course, and that
his error must have occurred later on. They spent a good deal of
time on the game, and meanwhile Lasker came in. They told him how
the game had ended and played it over for him; but when they came to the
point where my opponent won the exchange, he interrupted them and said,
“Oh, no, that move can’t be right.” The aged master had realized at
once what others had failed to perceive: that the win of the exchange was
an error which lost not only the advantage, but the game itself. Lasker saw that it was not my opponent who had made the combination, but
I! Several hours later he met me in the hotel and said, “You must
have been relieved when your opponent swallowed the bait.” Then he
added, “These players are not so strong as most people think.” And
so Lasker had been the only one who had appraised the position properly
and had been fully aware of the possibilities it contained.” - Capablanca.
(* Historian Edward Winter points out that it was Alekhine! Capablanca
cannot bring himself to pronounce the name of his adversary - NSH.)
Capablanca - Alekhine
Nottingham 1936,
Dutch Defence [A92]
(Notes by Capablanca)
Capablanca |
Alekhine |
1.d4 e6 2.Nf3 f5 3.g3 Nf6 4.Bg2 Be7
5.0–0 0–0 6.c4 Ne4 7.Qb3
       
  
  
 
   
A dubious move. It would have been
better to play 7.Qc2.
7...Bf6 8.Rd1 Qe8 9.Nc3 Nc6 10.Nb5 Bd8
11.Qc2
11.d5 was probably the most correct move in this position. Then would
have followed 11...Na5 12.Qc2 c6 13.dxc6 bxc6 14.Nd6
11...d6 12.d5
Here 12.Be3 should possibly have been played.
12...Nb4 13.Qb3 Na6 14.dxe6 Nac5 15.Qc2 Nxe6 16.Nfd4 Nxd4 17.Nxd4 Bf6
From the opening Black has certainly obtained the better game.
18.Nb5
A poor move. White should have played 18.Be3 threatening Nb5.
18...Qe7 19.Be3 a6 20.Nd4
It is clear that White has wasted a move.
20...Bd7 21.Rac1 Rae8 22.b4 b6 23.Nf3 Nc3
Black goes in for an incorrect combination. He thinks to win the
exchange, after which, however, he ends up with a poor, and perhaps
totally lost game.
24.Rd3 f4?
This move is the real error spotted by Lasker. In his annotations
Capablanca misses the stronger line 24...Ba4! 25.Qd2 Ne4 26.Qe1 g5 – NSH.
25.gxf4 Bf5 26.Qd2 Bxd3 27.exd3 c5?
Despair. Only now did Black realize his mistake and he tries to
save the position by artificial moves, which, of course, do not achieve
their aim. He should have continued 27...Na4, but then White would
had the extremely strong move 28.Ng5 (Besides, 28.d4 would
also have been good, since for a long time the Black knight would have
remained out of play.)
28.Rxc3 Bxc3 29.Qxc3 Qf6 30.Qxf6 gxf6
Black has two rooks against three minor pieces and a pawn. It is
true that White's pawn is doubled, but in such positions a doubled pawn
is worth as much as a normal one.
31.Nd2! f5
The pawn could not be taken because of 32.Ne4!
32.b5!
A strong move, which deprives Black of his last drawing chances.
32...a5
Of course he cannot play 32...axb5 33.cxb5 after which the knight goes
to c4, attacking the Black pawns.
33.Nf1+- Kf7 34.Ng3 Kg6 35.Bf3 Re7 36.Kf1 Kf6 37.Bd2 Kg6 38.a4
In this position the game was adjourned, and was resigned a few days
later without being resumed. Capablanca indicates the winning plan
with the regrouping of his pieces. The h-pawn would advance to h5.
The bishops would move to c3 and h3. The king would move to f3.
The knight would reach d5 via fi-e3. Black would have little
counterplay against this plan and soon be reduced to virtual stalemate
and lose material.
1–0
This magnificent tribute fails to answer only one question: Why did Lasker
lose to Capablanca?
| The key to the mystery lies in his match against Steintz. Lasker, who
was to call himself a disciple of the Old Master, had assimilated the best
of his teachings. But he had also discovered the flaws in his theory
and practice. The dogmatic attitude of Steinitz, his reliance on
abstract principles and his unwillingness to make concrete evaluation of
individual positions did not escape Lasker’s scrutiny. In game after
game Steinitz's underestimation of tactical possibilities turned out to be
fatal. But Lasker also proved to be his superior in queenless middle games
and played endings with superlative skill. Between the two of them,
Lasker had more of an objective judgment and a flexible attitude.
Intuitively, he understood the dynamics of a position much better than
Steinitz.
But the Match also has had a deep impact on Lasker. |
.jpg)
Wilhelm Steinitz |
In spite of his resolve
to confront Steinitz with his own principles, he had engaged the Old master
in chaotic struggles and become victorious. Inwardly, he had begun to
develop profound doubts about Steinitzian theories and principles. Lasker,
the believer had now become Lasker, the skeptic. But there was no cause for
anxiety. He had discovered his own genius in provoking unfathomable
complications. This gave him enormous confidence in his powers. In the
years to come he was to be a law unto himself, breaking old axioms with
impunity. It took a Capablanca to demonstrate to the old warlord and
gambler that he could not violate principles of positional play without
coming to grief himself.
In the Introduction to the book Soltis goes
rather overboard in stating that many of Lasker’s moves were based on sound
pragmatic considerations.
|
But
his analysis of games bear testimony to the extraordinary depth and
complexity of Lasker’s play.
There are 100
well-annotated games covering the entire span of Lasker’s career in this
book. The list of opponents reads like who’s who of chess history:
Steinitz, Tarrasch, Tschigorin, Pillsbury, Rubinstein, Schlecter, Capablanca
and Alekhine. It is a pity that Nimzovitsch alone is missing from the
lot.
As a games
collection, this book is a treasure trove. The commentary is lucid and
illuminating, with the author lavishing a wealth of analysis on every game.
The result is a radical reassessment of Lasker’s games. In recent
years quite a few GMs, like Dvoretsky, Timman and Nunn, have re-examined
Lasker’s play and made several discoveries, not to mention Kasparov’s own
work in his book
My Great Predecessors -
Part 1.
|
Harry Nelson Pillsbury |
Soltis takes into account each of these developments and presents the games
in proper perspective. If he goes wrong on occasion, it is not surprising.
Lasker’s play has always defied annotators, as Kasparov himself would
acknowledge. The last word on these games has not been said yet.
Discerning readers would find here fighting draws and miraculous victories
with Lasker saving hopeless positions and turning the tables on the
opponent. Connoisseurs of openings would find Lasker’s Defence to the QGD
and the London System against the Reti valuable. Let us not forget that
Kramnik discovered the Berlin Defence to Ruy Lopez in Lasker’s games and
used it as a surprise weapon against Kasparov in their World Championship
Match. The bemused Garry could not breach the Berlin Wall, and this played a
major role in Kramnik’s victory.
Unfortunately there is little biographical detail (space being the
constraint) in this book, and Soltis should have resisted the common
temptation of Tarrasch-bashing. The dead cannot speak for themselves.
Now for the games:
Lasker,Emanuel (GER) (2720) - Alekhine,Alexander A (RUS) (2700)
St. Petersburg, 1914
1.d4 d5 2.c4 e5
The Albin Counter-Gambit. This was the only
tournament in which Alekhine essayed this opening. Lasker, on
the other hand, had considerable experience playing this opening in a
number of offhand games.
3.dxe5 d4 4.Nf3 Nc6 5.a3 Bg4 6.Nbd2 Qe7 7.h3 Bxf3
8.Nxf3 0-0-0 9.Qd3 h6
Black stops Bg5 and ensures that he can regain the
pawn with ...g6 and ...Bg7. Not 9...Nxe5?! 10.Qf5+ Nd7 11.Nxd4±
10.g3 g6 11.Bg2 Bg7 12.0-0 Nxe5 13.Nxe5 Bxe5 14.b4
f5!
Not 14...Nf6?? 15.f4 Bd6 16.c5+-
15.c5 Qe6 16.c6! Ne7!
Black's intent is to allow cxb7+ with the hope that
the pawn will get in the way of White's attack.
17.cxb7+ Kb8 18.Bb2 Rd6 19.Rac1 Rhd8 20.Rc2
White prepares to target the c7-pawn and defers making
a choice between pushing the queenside pawns and trying to win the
d-pawn.
In his otherwise excellent annotations to this game
Soltis is under the impression that the exchange of queens leads to a
favorable ending for White. So he prefers 20.Qc4 Qxc4 (20...Nd5?
21.Bxd4!) 21.Rxc4 Nd5 22.Rfc1 Nc3 23.Kf1. But this line
fails to 23...Nxe2! 24.Kxe2 d3+ 25.Kd2 Bxb2. Lasker understood
the dynamics of such positions better.
20...f4!
Not 20...Nd5? 21.Bxd4! Nxb4 22.Bxa7+ Kxa7 23.Qe3+ Bd4
24.Qxe6 Rxe6 25.axb4+-
21.gxf4 Bxf4 22.Rd1 Nf5 23.Bc1?
White should have played 23.Qe4 Qb3 (23...Be5
24.Rc5) 24.Bc1 d3!? 25.Rxd3 Qxc2 26.Bxf4 Rxd3. After 27.exd3
and 28.Qc4 Qxc4 Black would be playing without the king.
27...Qxd3 (27...Rxd3?? 28.Qe8++-) 28.Bxc7+! Kxc7 29.b8Q+!+-
23...Ne3! 24.Rc5!
Not 24.fxe3 dxe3 25.Rc6 Rxd3 26.Rxd3 Qe7 27.Re6 Rxd3
28.Rxe7 Rd1+ 29.Bf1 Rxc1
24...Qf6!
It is a pity that Soltis does not explain why
24...Nxd1 should not be played. After 25.Bxf4 Nc3 (25...Nb2
26.Bxd6!) 26.Bxd6 Rxd6 27.e3 White has the upper hand.
25.Qe4! Nxd1
Not 25...Re6?! 26.Qf3 Bh2+ 27.Kxh2 Qxf3 28.Bxf3 Nxd1
29.Bxh6 Nxf2 30.Bf4
26.Bxf4
|
